The Second Circuit remanded to the Commissioner to examine whether Fowlkes's benefits were suspended as of the date of a warrant or order issued by a court or other authorized tribunal on the basis of a finding that Fowlkes fled or was fleeing from justice, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(4)(A) (2000) and 206 C.F.R. § 416.1339(b)(1).

The Court held that the statute does not permit the Commissioner to conclude simply from the fact that there is an outstanding warrant for a person's arrest that he is "fleeing to avoid prosecution." 10 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(4)(A). "Fleeing" in § 1382(e)(4)(A) is understood to mean the conscious evasion of arrest or prosecution. See Black's Law Dictionary 670 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "flight" as "[t]he act or an instance of fleeing, esp. to evade arrest or prosecution"). Thus, there must be some evidence that the person knows his apprehension is sought.

The Court also held that 20 C.F.R. § 416.1339(b)(1) does not permit the